Research on the "emotional brain" remains centered around the idea that emotions like fear, happiness, and sadness result from specialized and distinct neural circuitry. Accumulating behavioral and physiological evidence suggests, instead, that emotions are grounded in core affect--a person's fluctuating level of pleasant or unpleasant arousal.
The measurement of the volume of the human amygdala in vivo has received increasing attention over the past decade, but existing methods face several challenges. First, due to the amorphous appearance of the amygdala and the difficulties in interpreting its boundaries, it is common for protocols to omit sizable sections of the rostral and dorsal regions of the amygdala comprising parts of the basolateral complex (BL) and central nucleus (Ce), respectively.
The midbrain periaqueductal gray (PAG) region is organized into distinct subregions that coordinate survival-related responses during threat and stress [Bandler R, Keay KA, Floyd N, Price J (2000) Brain Res 53 (1):95-104]. To examine PAG function in humans, researchers have relied primarily on functional MRI (fMRI), but technological and methodological limitations have prevented researchers from localizing responses to different PAG subregions.
Functional neuroimaging of affective systems often includes subjective self-report of the affective response. Although self-report provides valuable information regarding participants' affective responses, prior studies have raised the concern that the attentional demands of reporting on affective experience may obscure neural activations reflecting more natural affective responses.
Experiences of emotion are content-rich events that emerge at the level of psychological description, but must be causally constituted by neurobiological processes. This chapter outlines an emerging scientific agenda for understanding what these experiences feel like and how they arise. We review the available answers to what is felt (i.e., the content that makes up an experience of emotion) and how neurobiological processes instantiate these properties of experience.
Scientists have traditionally assumed that different kinds of mental states (e.g., fear, disgust, love, memory, planning, concentration, etc.) correspond to different psychological faculties that have domain-specific correlates in the brain. Yet, growing evidence points to the constructionist hypothesis that mental states emerge from the combination of domain-general psychological processes that map to large-scale distributed brain networks.
The brain stores information in an associative manner so that contextually related entities are connected in memory. Such associative representations mediate the brain's ability to generate predictions about which other objects and events to expect in a given context. Likewise, the brain encodes and is able to rapidly retrieve the affective value of stimuli in our environment. That both contextual associations and affect serve as building blocks of numerous mental functions often makes interpretation of brain activation ambiguous.
Patients with schizophrenia exhibit cognitive and sensory impairment, and object recognition deficits have been linked to sensory deficits. The "frame and fill" model of object recognition posits that low spatial frequency (LSF) information rapidly reaches the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and creates a general shape of an object that feeds back to the ventral temporal cortex to assist object recognition. Visual dysfunction findings in schizophrenia suggest a preferential loss of LSF information.
The cortical mechanisms associated with conscious object recognition were studied using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Participants were required to recognize pictures of masked objects that were presented very briefly, randomly and repeatedly. This design yielded a gradual accomplishment of successful recognition. Cortical activity in a ventrotemporal visual region was linearly correlated with perception of object identity.
The human amygdala robustly activates to fear faces. Heightened response to fear faces is thought to reflect the amygdala's adaptive function as an early warning mechanism. Although culture shapes several facets of emotional and social experience, including how fear is perceived and expressed to others, very little is known about how culture influences neural responses to fear stimuli. Here we show that the bilateral amygdala response to fear faces is modulated by culture.
